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Observers have tended to place the Silk Road proposals in the context of ‘China’s rise,’ and its 
increasing influence and interests in Central, South and South-East Asia. From a realist perspective, 
China, like any expanding state, poses a potential threat. From a liberal angle, it is expanding the space 
for cooperation. Both models rely on an individualist ontology that highlights the interests of individual 
states. The potential of the Silk Roads looks somewhat different if approached from the perspective of a 
more relational ontology and a concept of entanglement. We draw on a few claims from Alexander 
Wendt’s (2015) recent book  as a framework for examining the emerging reality of the new ‘Silk 
Roads.’ What are the implications of this ontological shift for thinking about the Chinese ‘Silk Road’ 
proposal, and is this metaphor or reality? We develop three specific claims as part of a reflection on this 
context: first, language use is a form of measurement that shapes and transforms reality; second, 
language use is an expression of entanglement; and third, leaders have a large role in ‘collapsing wave 
functions’ around specific potentials. While some of the themes that arise in this discussion are 
compatible with other arguments about the role of language, the quantum angle provides a more explicit 
point of departure for discussing the ‘physical’ dimensions of language use, the multiple layers of 







On 7 September 2013, at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan, Chinese 
president Xi Jinping ‘proposed to build an ‘economic belt along the Silk Road’ (China 
Daily, 2013a). Later, on 2 October, in a speech to the Indonesian Parliament, he announced 
an effort to build ‘the Maritime Silk Road of the 21th century’ (China Daily, 2013b). Both 
projects have since acquired significant political momentum. In May 2014 the city 
government of Fuzhou signed an agreement with the China Africa Development Bank and 
the Fujian branch of the China Development Bank to jointly set up a $1.6 billion fund for a 
‘maritime silk road’ plan, for the purpose of building ports and to boost maritime 
connectivity with Southeast Asia and countries along the Indian Ocean (Shanghai Daily, 
2014). In November, at the Beijing APEC summit, President Xi announced that China 
would contribute $40 billion to set up the Silk Road fund, which would be used to provide 
investment and financial support to facilitate infrastructure, industrial and financial 
cooperation (China.org, 2014). As of January 2015, $100 billion had been authorized for the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which now has 82 members (Weinland, 
2017), to supply the capital for infrastructure construction (People’s Daily, 2015). What has 
since been more formally named the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative (OBOR) will include a 
free trade zone to link coastal areas, ‘infrastructure construction’ in countries such as 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (Krishman, 2014), and high-speed rail negotiations with 
28 nations, most along the ancient trade routes, with a total length of track over 5000 km on 
the agenda.   
 Observers have tended to place the Silk Road proposals in the context of ‘China’s rise,’ 
and its increasing influence and interests in Central, South and South-East Asia. Many 
foreign analysts have referred to the OBOR as ‘a comprehensive strategy’ or a ‘geopolitical 
and diplomatic offensive’ (Pop, 2016). Realists have argued that China intends to use its 
robust infrastructure programme to create overseas bases to threaten India’s perceived sphere 
of influence and increase Chinese influence by challenging the regional order. For example, 
Kanwal Sibal (2014) argues that the ultimate goal of the Chinese rhetoric of the Maritime 
Silk Road is to ‘create a strategic space for itself in the western Pacific and then move into 
the Indian Ocean gradually’. Nicholas (2015) found somewhat stronger evidence to support a 
liberal argument regarding the opportunities for common development, multilateral growth 
and addressing the failures of current global and regional institutions. Tiezzi  (2014a; 2014b) 
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puts a realist spin on the liberal economic perspective, noting that even if China only 
envisions economic movement as its rationale for building the Silk Roads, these by 
themselves represent a strategic action, not least because investment can be translated into a 
‘potential weapon’.  From a realist perspective, China, like any expanding state, poses a 
potential threat. From a liberal angle, it is expanding the space for cooperation. Both models 
rely on an individualist ontology that highlights the interests of individual states. Neither 
perspective can shed light on the conceptual challenges that Chinese proposals present for 
world politics, assuming instead that China either wants to cooperate (the liberal argument) or 
conquer (the realist argument). Neither can accommodate the possibility that China’s rise 
may not only alter the world’s distribution of power, but may also reconfigure the way that 
global politics work. In so far as both liberalism and realism assume a world ‘out there,’ fully 
formed, there is little recognition of the conceptual underpinnings of different world orders. 
China’s new silk roads, as a constitutive element of its rise as a world power, are not only a 
material phenomenon but part of a conceptual reorganization that will impact on the norms, 
institutions and the behaviour of diplomacy (Callahan 2016).  
The potential of the Silk Roads looks somewhat different if approached from the 
perspective of a more relational ontology and a concept of entanglement.1 Language, as an 
expression of entanglement, both enables and constrains precisely because of its relationality. 
While the notion of entanglement and its implication might be unpacked from the perspective 
of quantum physics, or a Buddhist or Daoist ontology,2 given space constraints, we draw on a 
few claims from Alexander Wendt’s book, Quantum Mind and Social Science, which 
provides a concise, if rather dense, formulation for a social science audience (Wendt, 2015). 
The book does not address the empirical implications of a relational ontology, or its 
significance for the political context explored here. What follows is an attempt to grapple 
with the significance of a small part of his argument as a framework for understanding the 
emerging reality of the new ‘Silk Roads.’ 
                                                          
1 The idea that ‘reality’ is instantiated in language is evident in ancient thinkers, such as Wang Chen, 
who in the Tao of Peace, identified a human tendency to conceptualize as a source of conflict and 
suffering in the world (Wang, 1999: 14), or in the 2nd century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna’s 
concept of ‘dependent origination,’ or more recently, the Chinese philosopher Zhao who explores the 
ancient Chinese concept下 Tianxia (All-under-heaven), for thinking about contemporary global 
politics (Zhao, 2009). 
2 Here is worth mentioning the family resemblance, identified by Niels Bohr (1958), between 
quantum physics and Eastern wisdom. For an examination of this family resemblance as it relates to 




Wendt argues that the social sciences, and the dominant frameworks of International 
Relations, whether realism, liberalism or constructivism, rely on assumptions of materiality, 
atomism, mechanism, determinism and objectivism, which have their origins in classical 
physics. When applied to the Chinese OBOR, this view, as expressed by realists, would see a 
great power expanding its material and strategic interests, perhaps influenced by a 
mechanistic balance of power, and a deterministic relationship between capability and 
success, all of which can be assessed by an outside objective observer. Quantum physics 
expands the space within which the materiality of classical physics is understood, thereby 
opening possibilities to resolve otherwise intractable problems. Wendt’s approach to the 
relevance of quantum physics for the social sciences highlights the entanglement of wave 
functions, language as an expression of entanglement, a holistic universe, the possibility of 
non-local causation and a norm of indeterminism, all of which provides a physical basis for 
mutual constitution that is otherwise untenable (Wendt, 2015).  
What are the implications of this ontological shift for thinking about the Chinese ‘Silk Road’ 
proposal, and is this metaphor or reality? While doing justice to his complex argument would be a very 
large task, in this short piece we develop three claims from the book as part of reflection on a particular 
context: first, language use is a form of measurement that shapes and transforms reality; second, 
language use is an expression of entanglement; and third, while leaders have a large role in ‘collapsing 
wave functions’ around specific potentials, the realisation of these potentials is fundamentally dependent 
on practice on the ground. While some of the themes that arise in this discussion are compatible with 
other arguments about the role of language, the quantum angle provides a more explicit point of 
departure for discussing the ‘physical’ dimensions of language use.   
 
Language use is a form of measurement 
While Xi Jinping’s reference to the ancient ‘silk roads’ can be understood as either 
metaphor or analogy, given their link to an historic past, Wendt’s quantum argument rests on 
a claim that language use transforms reality.  As he states, ‘In language, what brings about a 
concept’s collapse from potential meaning into an actual one is a speech act, which may be 
seen as a measurement that puts it into a context, with both words and potential listeners’ 
(Wendt, 2015: 217). This claim about measurement builds on the famous double slit 
experiment in quantum physics which established that observation changes the object of 
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measurement. 3 The quantum argument deals in multiple potentials and the collapse of wave 
functions around one potential rather than others (Wendt, 2015). So, while China is a nation-
state, and a participant in the practices of interstate-diplomacy, the Silk Roads, as a speech 
act, instantiates a different measure of reality. This measure provides the actors involved with 
a specific set of identities and intentions, establishes a specific narrative of time and sets up a 
particular line of historical development, a complex mix of reality which realism and 
liberalism are not theoretically equipped to tackle.   
Chinese leaders state that they are ‘reviving’ the ancient Silk Road (see Xinhua, 2015), 
which implies that the contemporary phenomena is the Silk Road rather than analogous to it, 
although what is being revived differs dramatically from the original, given the role of 
modern infrastructure and the trade of oil. The more recent history of international relations 
has been framed around states with clear boundaries that distinguish ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and 
there is a strong pull to re-enact this potential.4 Having said this, Asian states have 
historically been victim to the expansion of modern statehood, as reflected not least in 
China’s ‘century of humiliation.’ 5  
The Silk Roads arise from a much older historical memory that is very much alive in 
Asia, although this broader view of history has elsewhere been all but forgotten or 
orientalised (Frankopan, 2015). While China had an important place along the ancient Silk 
Roads, they had no single centre. The spatial construction of roads covered an expansive 
area, spanning Eurasia and including the seas. The Silk Roads were characterised less by 
states fixed in space than process, movement and exchange, although also dependent on local 
powers to maintain the security of the routes. The latter suggests a world constituted around 
multiple perspectives, where knowledge was not imposed from a single Archimedian point, 
but arose from engagement across multiple locations in space.  
                                                          
3 According to Robin Wang, from a Daoist perspective, that anything can be simultaneously yin or 
yang reinforces the fact that ‘things are always implicated in multiple relations at once.’ It is the 
intentions and priorities of the observer that determine which relation is in view (Wang, 2012: 7).  
This conclusion resonates with the outcome of the double-slit experiment in quantum physics that 
measurement changes the object of observation. 
4 Indeed, the OBOR has been presented as analogous to Europe between the end of the 19th century 
and the years before World War I, when ‘strong nations jostled one another for industrial and military 
dominance. In this argument, the OBOR strategy combines land power and maritime power, 
bolstering China’s existing oceanic hegemony in East Asia. See (Tsui et al, 2017).  
5 The “Century of Humiliation” refers to a period between 1839 and 1949 of imperialism by Western 




In so far as Chinese proposals refer to future potentials, the speech act provides the broad 
contours of what is to be constructed, and a particular measurement of what would otherwise 
be a series of land tracks and sea routes, with people bumping into each other along the way. 
In this respect, it establishes a context in a situation that would otherwise lack clear structure 
or boundaries. This framework then guides – although it does not entirely determine – how 
actors understand themselves within it and thus what they do. The ‘Silk Road’ evokes a set of 
meanings and possibilities. The metaphor of Silk, for example, suggests that items of very 
high quality and value are being traded. The road alludes to a place of travel that connects 
one place to another. Furthermore, although the US, India and China share an interest in 
having a key economic and political role in Asia, only China frames its interests as a 
continuation of an order that extends over a very long timespan in which Chinese leadership 
was the rule and its weakness the brief exception. All this helps to clarify that, by definition, 
for China the new Silk Roads are long-term tools to shape the world both conceptually and 
materially, rather than a short-term strategy to achieve global hegemony, as is so often 
assumed (see Yale, 2015).  
 Social scientific methodology presumes the ability to analyse an objective material 
world independent of the meaning human agents bring to it. Measurement involves the 
enumeration of causal relations between subjects or objects that are assumed to have an 
intrinsic identity. By contrast, the naming of the Silk Road, from a more quantum 
perspective, contains a measurement in and of itself.  This instantiates a material reality that 
will further unfold, not least because the concept has become a focal point for multilateral 
agreements regarding investments and development within this context. To say that it is a 
work in progress is to point both to the renaming of a range of practices and material 
developments, many of them well established (India’s World, 2014), as well as a shift in the 
meaning of those practices, and how various participants engage with each other. At the core 
is the difference between understanding units as ontologically apriori and separate, as in 
realism and liberalism, as opposed understanding identity as emergent, in the case of the Silk 
Roads. A further distinction can be made between the measure of ‘what is’ in social scientific 
methodology in contrast to quantum measurement in which observation transforms its object. 
The ‘Silk Roads,’ as presented by the Chinese leadership, contain a measurement of a 
regional or global reality which establishes a particular vision with practical import; its 
symbolism is one of cultures interacting, learning from one another, and the exchange of 
goods and ideas. In discussing the new Silk Roads, President Xi Jinping and other Chinese 
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leaders point to a strategy of connectivity and relationality, which rests on an acceptance of 
diversity, respecting each other’s core interests and concerns.6 The fear is that Chinese 
‘order’ will eliminate diversity – and here critics might point to the quelling of dissent in 
China or the repression of Tibet. The conception of order implied by ‘All under Heaven,’ as 
articulated by the Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang, or the Silk Roads, as articulated by 
Chinese leaders, suggests that it is possible for order (harmony) and diversity to co-exist, and 
the Silk Roads provide an historical precedent (Callahan, 2008: 751-52).  
 The OBOR strategy has five major goals within a broad framework of connectivity 
and cooperation, which includes policy coordination; facilitating connectivity; unimpeded 
trade; financial integration and people-to-people bonds (NDRC, 2015). The core is a stated 
intention to build peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation, two ideas that have been part 
of China’s international agenda. The conceptualization of the Silk Roads is closely linked to 
what has been defined as a “spirit” (精神, jīngshén) of peace (和平, hépíng), friendship (友好
, yǒuhǎo), openness (开放 kāifàng) and inclusivity (包容, bāoróng).7 The ‘Silk Road Spirit’ 
includes ‘peace and cooperation, openness and inclusivity, mutual learning and mutual 
benefit’ (NDRC, 2015), which should prevail throughout the new Silk Road, as was the case 
in the past. In China’s view, ancient trade and cultural interchange along the Silk Road was 
peaceful, as represented for instance, by the migration of Buddhism from India to China, 
cross-cultural exchanges across the region, and the spread of art, all of which suggest that 
today’s cultural exchange will once again be an important element of the OBOR (Xinhuanet, 
2014b; 2014c). As stated by Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in 
2015, ‘the Belt and Road’ will ‘promote inter-civilizational exchanges to build bridges of 
friendship for our people, drive human development and safeguard peace in the world.’8 In 
brief, the Chinese proposals form part of a more comprehensive approach to regional or 
global politics that highlights the peaceful character of China’s foreign affairs. Chinese 
leaders themselves have linked the proposal to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
which underpin the foreign policy of People’s Republic of China (Xi, 2014).  
                                                          
6 See, for instance, (Yang, 2014), (Pu et al, 2014) and (Chen and Tang, 2014)  
7 The arrangement of the components and the terms employed differ slightly in the sources, but most 
of them in both Chinese and English point out to the same positive characteristics of the Chinese 
policies. This particular one is from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (NPC, 2014); see also 
(Xinhuanet, 2014a).  
8 As cited in (Winter, 2016). 
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China’s proposals emphasize repeatedly the important role of mutuality and mutual 
respect in its international conduct. Chinese texts signal, in diverse ways, a call to integrate its 
own interests with the development of other countries. The Chinese government has 
frequently stated that the project should be mutually constructed by all parties involved in 
both its conceptualisation and implementation (People’s Daily, 2014). As with the peaceful 
approach mentioned above, concepts such as mutual benefit, win-win or mutual construction 
(互利 hùlì, 共赢 gòngyíng and 共建 gòngjiàn respectively), are consistent with previous 
Chinese foreign policy discourse.9 Thus far China has managed to balance its ambitions with 
a largely peaceful and cooperative foreign policy, as defined by its own discourse. This grants 
legitimacy to the new Silk Roads, although there is no question that the sheer scale of China’s 
objectives raises questions about its intentions, i.e. regional/global hegemony (Dobra-Manço, 
2015). However, while realism can only conceive of a world in which China seeks power for 
the sake of power, a quantum reading of intentionality is about potentials, and in this case 
China’s potential to become an hegemonic power while building a global order based of 
mutual gains and peaceful coexistence.   
  
Language and Entanglement 
Realists are concerned that the language of politicians can’t always be trusted, in so far as it 
may disguise intentions other than those communicated in language, which rests on an 
assumption that language is epiphenomonal to material reality. A clear example can be found 
in  E.H. Carr’s  (2016) classical work on liberal language of  ‘Harmony of Interests’ in the 
period of crisis between World Wars I and II. One of Wendt’s key claims is that 
consciousness and intention, while often ignored in social sciences, have not been adequately 
addressed. The ‘hard problem’ is that one can’t get to a notion of consciousness from a purely 
materialist perspective.10 He situates consciousness at the interface between inside and 
outside, highlighting its subjective or private dimensions as well as its relational qualities. 
Organisms – and he does not distinguish human organisms from other forms of life, ‘all the 
                                                          
9 Official Chinese discourse depicts China’s development as a process that is diametrically opposed to 
the rise of European/American imperialism, which is in turn depicted as a historical anomoly that 
interrupted the peaceful way of conducting international affairs that is said to characterize China for 
hundreds of years. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made of this a quintessential component of 
their ideological projects.  
10 From a realist perspective, intention is difficult to access given the ‘other minds’ problem. He 
further argues that those who highlight the intersubjective dimensions of language, do not sufficiently 
acknowledge human subjectivity and the more private dimensions of consciousness. 
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way down’ - have a sense of ‘I’ or ‘what it is like’ to be them (Wendt, 2015: 142), but also 
depend on energy from the environment to survive. Against this backdrop, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping’s statement in response to the economic policies of the new Trump administration 
in the U.S. are of interest: ‘Pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room. 
While wind and rain may be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air’ 
(Phillips, 2017). Whether at the level of cells, individual or states, it is less a hard wall than a 
permeable membrane that distinguishes inside from outside.  
This then raises the question of how to understand the Chinese intention in 
constituting the OBOR. From the realist perspective, we have every reason to be suspicious 
of Chinese activities, given that it has demonstrated its muscle in the East or South China 
Seas and its economic investments along the Silk Road will give it undue leverage over more 
local policies. As a great power with regional and global interests, the expansion of its power 
is undoubtedly an element of ‘its’ intention. The point of Wendt’s argument is that the wave 
function collapse of individuals, while instantiated through their practices, is also entangled 
in social structures and cannot be fully separated from more collective intentions that make 
them possible (Wendt, 2015: 264-5).11 The language of the Silk Roads is constitutive of a 
particular reality which is prior to any truth claims. As such intention is not merely the sum of 
individuals as separate parts, but holistic and constituted through non-local entanglements 
mediated by language. The potentials expressed by the ‘Silk Roads,’ and their material 
instantiation do not belong solely to Xi Jinping nor even, in so far as this potential covers a 
large space covering the Eurasian continent, China alone. It is dependent on practices on 
ground, across this huge expanse of territory and water, including the degree to which other 
societies and states buy into them and themselves articulate or contest this potential through 
their practices. Wang Yiwei (2017) captures the point in his examination of the Chinese 
meaning of ‘road’ as ‘way,’ which is also a reference to the Dao. In the Chinese character 
Daolu, which means ‘road,’ Lu is the method to realize the Dao, which today means ‘the 
community facing the same fate.’12 He thus highlights the extent to which the openness of the 
                                                          
11 As Callahan (2016: 229) notes, the breadth and depth of Chinese diplomacy has expanded 
dramatically in recent decades. He highlights the argument of Shambaugh (2013: 45-120) that 
Chinese policymaking has to be understood in terms of five nested rings of actors, starting with senior 
decisionmaking leaders and fanning out from ministries to intelligence organism, localities and 
corporations and finally to society. Given the multiplicity of actors involved, one can raise of question 
of whose intention? 
12 This follows a reference to Chapter 42 of the Dao de Ching, the ancient classic of Daoism.’Dao 
generates one, one generates two, two generates three and then three generates our world. 
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Belt and Road to all players, and its inclusivity as opposed exclusivity, is embedded in the 
language itself. 
To focus purely on Xi Jinping’s intentionality, as an individual leader, is to ignore the 
further layers of intentionality within which he is embedded from the intersubjective 
environment of the Chinese leadership to the populations and authorities at various points 
along the Silk Roads to those outside, such as the United States. The key point about 
entanglement is that what is going on ‘inside the mind’ cannot be separated entirely from the 
language by which Xi Jinping or other Chinese leaders engage with their environment. This 
is not a causal relationship of imposing inside ‘will’ on the outside world, but a dynamic 
relationship between mutually interdependent parts, which is at the heart of Wendt’s claim 
that quantum physics provides a physical basis for mutual constitution that is otherwise 
untenable. A concept of entanglement highlights the extent to which intention, precisely 
because it is expressed in language, relies on layers of meaning, some of which are more 
specific to Chinese culture. For example, some authors have argued that China’s relations 
with other nations are influenced by the traditional ideal of not only being a powerful actor 
but also to be seen as a morally perfected one. The idea is rooted in Confucianism, for which 
obedience to the authority is not derived from coercion but from a leader’s virtue (Harrell, 
2013). When translated into the international dynamics of the OBOR, this means that Chinese 
leaders may well understand the proposal to be a mere component of a greater strategy to 
make China the next global hegemon, as realists would expect; however, their presentation of 
the OBOR as a project that will provide mutual benefits for its participants and peaceful 
cooperation for the world, points to an order that will, in their view, be morally superior to 
what exits today. which echoes the aforementioned Confucian premise, regarding the 
superiority of virtue over force.  
Leaders are important 
Wendt’s book concludes with a discussion about the role of leaders in collapsing 
wave functions around specific potentials, and thus the importance of bringing leaders back 
into the frame. He points, for instance to the difference that the election of President G.W. 
Bush, as opposed to Al Gore, made to the shape of international relations. Leaders, who have 
authority to speak for the state as a whole collapse a states’ potentialities into an actual choice 
with non-local consequences for everyone else in the group, and thus their intentions and 
character are important (Wendt, 2015: 260), a claim that resonates with Confucian arguments 
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about the importance of wise leaders. But a focus on leaders obscures the extent to which the 
potentialities they express are framed in larger public discourse and dependent on practice on 
the ground for their realization. Indeed, the UK Brexit vote or Trump’s election in the U.S. 
arose from a groundswell that represented in part a rejection of established leaders, even 
while constituting a space for the emergence of new ones. In the case of Xi Jinping’s Silk 
Road speech act, contestation from those potentially affected has been as apparent as 
agreement and participation in the OBOR. While Wendt emphasizes that social structures are 
‘continuously popping in and out of existence with the practices through which they are 
instantiated,‘ the role of contestation – and indeed politics more generally - is largely missing 
from his argument. This is particularly evident in his claim that that the actualization of social 
structures and identity expresses a teleological purpose, which points towards its realization 
(Wendt, 2015: 265).  
But what happens when the ‘teleological purpose’ of one leader’s instantiation comes 
into conflict with another? Take, for instance, the dispute over the Senakaku/Diaoyu islands, 
which arose from ‘wave function collapse’ around and the distinct teleological purposes of 
two potentials, i.e. Japanese and Chinese. The islands themselves are material, and there are 
interests relating to oil, but the dispute itself is primarily conceptual. Contrary to the claim of 
one American writer that these islands ‘appear from afar to be a jumble of meaningless rocks’ 
(French, 2014), the conflict revolves around the naming of the islands, when they were 
occupied, the distinction between inhabited and occupied, different versions of international 
law, i.e. historically imposed by the West, in the view of the Chinese, or ‘imposing an 
arbitrary or at least an un-Western and unfamiliar logic,’ in the view of Japan (Lee, 2011). 
There is no purely objective basis for determining the ‘truth’ of any of these claims, beyond 
the social language by which they have been defined and contested. Or consider the now 
defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which provided a framework for regional relations 
in Asia that contrasted with the instantiation of the OBOR. These represent two distinct 
articulations of spatial organization and what these relations should look like, in so far as the 
former reserved a far larger place for U.S. involvement and influence than the latter.  
U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the TPP, has paved the way for the 
realization of the Chinese plan, not least because Trump’s own vision has increased the 
attractiveness of the former to many who would otherwise be skeptical, given its emphasis on 
free trade (Phillips, 2017). President Trump is instantiating a reality of hard protectionist 
walls around the U.S, which includes a measurement of immigrants or refugees, which goes 
13 
 
against the grain of certain American core values and constitutional guarantees. On the other 
hand, the new Silk Roads, have aroused suspicion and protest, not least in the context of East 
Asian island disputes. The removal of the TPP from the equation, shifts the contestation away 
from the horizontal relationship between the U.S. and China over the framing of Asian 
regionalization.  As already stated, the ancient Silk Roads express a particular meaning and 
type of regionalization or globalization that differs historically from the nation-state model, 
even while co-existing with it. Not only does the proposal have a power of appeal and 
legitimacy, given the meaning attached to the Silk Roads over several centuries of history, 
but the road, in the form of the OBOR, has already begun to materialize into a new, concrete 
entity with the construction of institutions, infrastructure, rail networks and ports. Both 
Trump and Xi Jinping are engaging actively in the process of transforming a relational reality 
in very different ways. While the one is pulling inward, putting America first, the other is 
building ‘connectivity’ across the Eurasian continent. While the contrast and its significance 
deserve greater attention than is possible here, we want to highlight the ontological 
differences between the two frameworks against the backdrop of Wendt’s argument. While 
Wendt’s claims are purely theoretical and focused on scientific argument rather than any 
political context, this juxtaposition highlights the danger of the hard walls being built around 
America, while raising questions about what the entanglement suggested by the Silk Roads 
might mean, which returns to the question of Chinese intentions.  
One of the strengths of the final section of Wendt’s book is the much clearer 
articulation in theoretical terms of the possibility of a social subjectivity. Social subjectivity 
contributes to a sense of collective identity as a community, not bounded by impermeable 
boundaries but rather entangled with that which is defined as outside. The organism needs to 
breathe, and this is dependent on an openness to and entanglement with its larger 
environment. This is a far better metaphor for intra-global relations, than the frequent 
conception of realist international relations in terms of, for instance, impenetrable billiard 
balls. Wendt, drawing on Karen Barad’s (2007 : 140) notion of ‘intra-action’, states that ‘who 
we become through measurements of each other is internal to our relationships – our 
entanglement – rather than something that happens outside of them’ (Wendt, 2015: 172). 13 
                                                          
13 The notion of intra-national relations builds on Barad’s argument that due to uncertainty, the 
distinction between subjects and/or objectives only becomes evident at the moment of interaction, that 
is it represents an intra-action by which each is formed by the other rather than engaging from the 
position of two intrinsic identities. Earlier Edkins (2003) made a similar argument with specific 
reference to international security, which she argued treats objects as independent of observation and 
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The concept of intra-action assumes that difference is defined within wholes, which can be 
distinguished from a realist or liberal perspective, which begins with the separability of 
individual unit, as in the ‘inter-national,’ which presumes the ontological separateness of 
states. 
Beginning to conceptualize ‘intra-global relations,’ and the importance of balance and 
interdependence between inside and outside, may provide an alternative way to think about 
globalisation, as Western states begin to collapse inward. The Chinese ‘One Road, One Belt’, 
while more open and ‘connective’, is rightly a concern for many, particularly if the diversity 
and respect embedded in its instantiation are not matched by practices on the ground. But 
Barak Obama’s point, as he was stepping down as leader, highlights the crucial point that 
ultimately none of this is about leaders – it is about all of us, normal people.14 Leaders are 
instantiations in and of themselves, so contestation over who they should be and how they 
should act is important. In so far as one might see some wisdom in Xi Jing’s warning against 
being in a closed room with no air, the main point is not that the world should embrace China 
rather than the U.S.15 Unless China is assumed to be all powerful in its ability to impose its 
will on the region or the globe, then the ‘Silk Road’ speech act instantiates a framework of 
interaction that limits Chinese power, even while empowering it. Language instantiates and is 
entangled with practice in the world; it does not stand outside it. The extent to which 
sceptical countries, such as India or Vietnam, can enact diversity, openness and respect, or 
contest its absence, along the OBOR will have an impact on how the regional networks 
develop.  
The physicist John Wheeler noted that we are all ‘participants’ in constructing the 
universe (Folger, 2002). In an uncertain world, the plans of Chinese leaders or any other 
should not be taken at face value. From this perspective, the OBOR represents neither a 
straightforward pursuit of global domination, nor should we ignore concerns about China’s 
power vis-à-vis its neighbours. The Silk Roads instantiate particular forms of practice, and 
not least respect for diversity, multiculturalism and connectivity, upon which the trust and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as existing before they interaction, based on a Newtonian cosmology that arose alongside forms of 
political community that led to the modern sovereign state (Edkins, 2003). 
14 Although here one might then also point to the 1 in 113 people in the world or are displaced through 
persecution, war or environmental catastrophe (Edwards, 2016), and who have limited capacity to 
speak precisely because they are stateless. 
15 Many would see this as dangerous, given China’s own record on human rights. It would look 
particularly ominous, I suspect, from the perspective of a Buddhist in Tibet. 
15 
 
legitimacy of China will depend.16 Just as yin always contains an element of yang (Ling, 
2014), China is both a participant in the existing framework of international relations, where 
states do act on the basis of interests, but also, through the OBOR or Silk Roads, engages in 
constituting a qualitatively different regional or global relationality. The materialization of 
the latter is not purely down to the intentions of Chinese leaders; rather its instantiation is 
dependent on the practices of leaders and populations all along the Silk Roads and the extent 
to which they mutually constitute shared understandings of their future. The existence of both 
contestation around these developments, as well as participation in them, are important to the 
co-emergence of both subjectivity and entanglement along the roads.   
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